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‘when beliefs… become hostage to desires and wishes, they do so only as the result of hidden 
and indirect processes, against which the disciplines of the virtues of truth are directed’ 
Williams (2002: 83) 
 
 
1. The thought that emotions play a central role in moral epistemology goes back at least to 
Aristotle. It is, of course, the centrepiece of various non-cognitivist theories, but has more 
recently been defended by cognitivists on the basis of cognitivist theories of emotion. Scanlon 
(1998), for example, talks of ‘judgment-sensitive attitudes’, which can arise from and be 
embedded in emotional and conative responses to the world. Such attitudes present the agent 
with reasons to favour or disfavour their objects, and the clarification of reasons, and so which 
attitudes are appropriate, proceeds by critical reflection upon them (Ch. 1, §12). The response-
dependence theories of Wiggins (1987/1998) and McDowell (1985) provide further examples. I 
shall assume that desires and emotions (‘passions’ from now on) are, at the very least, an 
important source of intuitions about moral reasons (I shall focus on reasons from now on), 
whether one gives a cognitive or non-cognitive analysis of them. 
 
As one might expect from attributing such a central role to emotions, such theories have 
remarked upon the relation between moral enquiry and developing self-understanding (e.g. 
Lenman 2008). But the theme has not been much elaborated upon. What follows is a 
contribution, though from a very specific angle.  
 
2. We naturally seek to understand ourselves and the vision of the world presented in passion. 
For example, when reflecting on emotions, we look for a ‘sufficient explanation’, which either 
shows that the emotion is appropriate, timely, proportionate, and so on, or explains why it is not. 
This understanding is the ground of the judgment that the emotion is appropriate, and so 
presents some reason to react or act, or it is inappropriate, and so does not. For desires, we 
consider whether what is desired is in fact desirable. It is a commonplace that passions are not 
always appropriate and may mislead regarding what reasons we have to feel, want, and do. 
Hence, there is a need, first, to recognise when and how we go wrong, and second, to correct 
ourselves and, if possible, prevent or mitigate future mistakes. 
 
One traditional model proposes that, in calmer moments, the apparent good presented by a 
passion can come to be understood and rationally evaluated through reflective introspection. 
Understand why one reacts as one does secures some control over the passion. Passions respond 
to reasons; reasoned accounts of the object and of the passion should therefore alter the passion 
if necessary. The model assumes that passions are ‘transparent’, and in two ways. First, attention 
to the passion in introspective reflection is sufficient for understanding it and the vision of the 
world and the good that it presents. The content of passions is unproblematically available for 
acceptance or rejection in reflection. Second, these processes are sufficient to change the passion 
– the question ‘what do I feel?’ gives way to the question ‘what ought I to feel?’, such that the 
answer to the latter determines the answer to the former.1 
 
Helpful though this is, it egregiously oversimplifies the complexity of the challenge. It presumes 
a way of identifying and then getting behind or beyond the misleading passion by sheer 
reflection, as though there were some intellectual space free from the influence of emotions. But 
passions can skew the ‘epistemic landscape’ outside awareness (Goldie 2008: 159f.). When this 
occurs, reflection takes place within the skewed landscape that seems ‘true’. Thus, even if there 
were an ‘emotion-free’ intellectual space, the grounds to be confident that one currently occupies 
it are often lacking. Furthermore, the process of reflection on passions and the reasons they 
present is itself deeply informed by further passions – sympathy, feelings of approbation, and 
other attitudes – that arise as reflection proceeds. This applies as much to reflecting upon the 
appropriateness of a passion as other forms of moral enquiry (Lacewing 2005). The role passions 
play in moral enquiry extends to include understandings of and reflections upon the situation 
and the self. A third difficulty forms the primary focus in what follows: passions are not always 
readily understood in reflective introspection alone; self-understanding is more demanding, and 
requires engagement with ‘hidden and indirect processes’ (Williams 2002: 83). The assumption of 
transparency is mistaken.2 
 
Hursthouse’s famous (1991) treatment of the debate around abortion from the perspective of 
virtue ethics provides a suitable example to begin with. She notes that, quite aside from the 
question of whether women have a moral right to have an abortion, in deciding to have an 
abortion on any particular occasion, a woman may be callous, light-minded, selfish, self-
righteous or disloyal (1991: 235). We can expect that the woman’s motivations and emotions that 
would make the act vicious lead her to understand the situation and possible courses of action in 
a particular, and inaccurate, light, and will feed into her deliberations about what to do. If she is 
unaware of these motivations, she fails to understand her decision for what it is. This is not 
improbable, since attitudes towards human life, death, parenthood, sex, and family relationships 
will influence attitudes toward abortion (1991: 238), and the passions surrounding such 
fundamental issues of human life are ambivalent and painful, to say the least. Thus, attitudes 
toward and deliberation on (an) abortion will be fed by many and various passions about other 
matters, including ambition, loyalty, fear, frustration, love, jealousy, and ambivalence, perhaps 
only tangentially related to the issue at hand. This is especially so when reflecting on a particular 
case that involves oneself, but can apply as much to forming a judgment about another’s 
situation. To develop Hursthouse’s example in a classically feminist way, if a man is unaware of 
his anxieties surrounding female sexuality, or unaware of their influence on his views about 
abortion, then his judgments may be distorted. 
 
The line of thought so far is this: passions heavily inform moral enquiry (especially in particular 
cases), but because they can be inappropriate and thus misleading, the acquisition of moral 
knowledge requires their refinement. This is no easy matter, as they lack transparency and can 
influence other passions and thoughts in complex ways of which we are unaware. 
 
3. It may be thought that the only or best counterpoint to misleading passions is provided by a 
communal form of moral enquiry, a process of mutual correction, as Wiggins and Lenman 
emphasise. But Williams (2002: 198) notes that while, in communal enquiry, ‘we can help sustain 
each other’s sense of reality, stopping wishes becoming beliefs’, it may also be that ‘I may 
reinforce your fantasies, and we may conspire in projecting wishes into a deceptive social 
hologram’. More generally, the structure of one’s passions affects the extent to which one can 
both the contribute to and make use of communal enquiry. Thus the virtues with which we shall 
be concerned, as a solution to the problem outlined, are not developed and refined merely by joint 
ethical enquiry. 
 
4. One wish – perhaps best conceived as the central or underpinning wish – involved in many of 
the processes that may distort the passions, or indeed moral enquiry directly, is the wish to avoid 
psychological pain, such as anxiety, fear, guilt, shame and envy, particularly in relation to 
questions of self-esteem. There are many means by which this is done, e.g. through distortions in 
understandings and experience of the self, of passions and thoughts, of others, or of the world. 
Psychologists call such means, when they occur unconsciously and unintentionally, ‘defence 
mechanisms’ (Vaillant 2000; Cramer 2006). This idea frames and develops aspects of our 
commonsense understanding of ourselves: we can immediately recognise the descriptions it gives 
from our experience.3 This is best shown by example. 
 
Returning to Hursthouse’s example: we noted that attitudes to such fundamental issues as life, 
death, parenthood, sex, and families are implicated in deliberations regarding abortion. A more 
fertile soil for defensive reactions is scarcely conceivable. Let us develop the idea that the 
decision is ‘light-minded’. It fails to take proper account of the value of human life, perhaps 
dismissing the death of the foetus as simply the medical extirpation of unnecessary cells, no 
more morally taxing than the removal of a benign tumour. Such an emotional response may 
defend against an unconscious fear of taking responsibility for life (one’s own or another’s). Or 
again, the woman’s decision is disloyal; perhaps it is even vengeful. Thoughts (which may be 
perfectly correct in themselves) that the decision is hers because it is her body may mask or 
crowd out grievances about the father, such that even if she is aware of the grievances, she fails 
to connect them to her decision. This kind of case applies as well when the decision is not to 
abort, e.g. the woman may wish for ‘more’ from her man, and having the child is her way of 
obtaining it symbolically. 
 
Anna Freud (1936) discusses a case of ‘false altruism’. Her example is of a woman, but it applies 
as well to men, so let us vary the gender. A man represses his own wishes, and projects them 
onto others. He then strongly identifies with other people. He therefore expresses great concern 
for them, but not for himself. He believes it is acceptable to fulfil their desires, and works to do 
so, but not to fulfil his own. However, he becomes annoyed if their desires are frustrated, as if 
wishes should be fulfilled without hindrance; and he becomes angry with people who are not 
similarly altruistic, as though this were some personal affront to him. Nietzsche (1886: §194) also 
comments on false altruism, though with a different emphasis:  
 
In helpful and benevolent people one nearly always finds a clumsy cunning that first 
rearranges the person who is to be helped so that, for example, he ‘deserves’ their help, 
needs their help in particular, and will prove to be deeply grateful, dependent, subservient 
for all their help. 
 
For both Anna Freud and Nietzsche, false altruism operates as a defence against various painful 
thoughts and feelings related to one’s own neediness.  
 
Our concern here is not with how such people act, but with what they know. Having this 
complex of passions and defences leads to a distorted understanding of the moral situation and 
one’s reasons for acting. The passions – the desire to help, the empathetic response, the altruistic 
concern – will present themselves as selfless and ‘other’-directed. But in fact, there is an 
inappropriate conceptualisation of the needs of others; a lack of recognition of the parity 
between oneself and others; a misunderstanding of one’s relations to others who are also in a 
position to help; little recognition of others’ responsibility for themselves, and with this, no real 
understanding of when, why, and how the needs of others furnish reasons to act on their behalf, 
the forms of response that are appropriate (which may be other than simply meeting those 
needs), and what reasons (for gratitude? reciprocity? resentment?) one’s action supplies the 
other. 
 
A third example: In a recent paper on lying, Alessandra Lemma (2005: 738) notes that ‘[i]n the 
moment of the lie, the liar creates the illusion that he can control, and therefore that he ‘knows’, 
what the other will believe and think.’ This may serve different functions, which we may connect 
to different contexts of defence. In the first, ‘the intent is to attack and triumph over the duped 
other. The object [i.e. the other] needs to be controlled and humiliated for the self’s gratification, 
often to reverse an earlier experience of humiliation.’ (ibid) The liar may be unaware of these 
needs to control and humiliate, perhaps as part of a defence against the pain of their own 
humiliation (if applicable). Such lack of awareness will affect an appreciation of when a lie is 
justified and when it is not, and more generally, the reasons relating to treating others with 
respect. In quite a different context, lying may ‘represent an attempt at communication with 
[someone] felt to be emotionally unavailable or inscrutable. The lie is used to substitute the ‘real’ 
self felt to be unlovable for a ‘made-up’ version of the self felt to guarantee the [person’s] love.’ 
(ibid) Again, if this is not recognised by the liar, the need to please the other will distort 
judgments about appropriate forms of relationship, including the justification of the lie. Third, 
the lie may be used as protection against someone who is intrusive or controlling. In some 
people (Lemma 2005: 749-50), lying becomes the primary way of dealing with such relationships, 
and even an automatic response to intimacy (which carries a potential threat of intrusiveness). 
Here again, an awareness of what one is doing and why may help one to see individual situations 
in a clearer light, and to understand how lying may well be justified, on occasion, when dealing 
with intrusive and controlling people. 
 
Defence mechanisms occur far more commonly than we might think. They are used universally 
in childhood and adolescence, as they are entirely necessary in psychological development. In 
forming a healthy self-esteem, there are many small battles in which children must first impose 
their wishes on their experience of reality and later relinquish such influence, maturing in 
themselves and their understanding as they go. The task of development involves giving up such 
distortions in early adulthood, but few people do so completely.4 The use of defence 
mechanisms is particular prevalent in conditions of stress and especially when self-esteem is at 
issue – both of which commonly apply in morally challenging situations. (Defences may remain 
adaptive in certain situations in adulthood, e.g. in situations of unbearable conflict or sudden 
change – a clear example is their use in the grieving process.) 
 
5. When they occur, defence mechanisms can lead to a misapprehension not only of what is felt 
and why, and the nature of the situation to which the passion is a response, but also, and because 
of this, of the reasons for acting, feeling, and desiring furnished by the situation. Thus the agent 
misunderstands both the reasons why he actually feels and acts as he does, generating a lack of 
transparency, and the reasons the situation in fact gives him to act and feel differently, generating 
error.  
 
Because these distortions occur unintentionally and unconsciously, any simple form of directed 
introspection of the passion itself cannot reliably detect whether the passion is influenced by 
defences or not. If defences or their results could be identified in this way, they would not be 
sufficiently outside awareness to work. As Cramer (2006: 29-30) puts it,  
 
[t]he purpose of attributing one’s own anger or envy to others [in projection] is to absolve 
oneself of the discomfort of harboring unacceptable thoughts or feelings. To realize that this 
negative perception of others is based on the attribution of one’s own negative emotions 
would be to acknowledge that one has such unacceptable emotions; such a realization would 
be a cause for self-reproach and anxiety.  
 
Furthermore, the distortions they impose on the understanding of the self and others need not 
be singular, confined to this or that situation. Rather, the distortion is in one’s general view of 
the world: 
 
A patient of mine inhabited a disappointing world. Although she was quite successful at 
work, had friends, and so on, there was no success in the social world that would not be 
interpreted by her under an aura of disappointment. If she got a raise at work, it was because 
the boss was shamed into it – he really wanted to give someone else in the office a raise, but 
he felt he had to give her one to appear fair. If she was invited out for a date, the person had 
already tried to go out with others and had failed. If someone congratulated her on some 
accomplishment, they were just being polite. And so on. From a distance it is clear to us, as it 
was not clear to her, how active she was in understanding her world in ways that were bound 
to disappoint. (Lear 2003: 48-9) 
 
Given this state of affairs, it is hard to see how the woman can begin to construct an alternative 
set of emotional responses; the ones she has are clearly justified by how the world is (as she 
experiences it). Her disappointment, what motivates and sustains it, how it acts as a defence, and 
against what – all this is not transparent to her. Whatever the answers, reflecting on her 
disappointment will not be enough to reveal or transform them. 
 
6. There is little discussion of defence mechanisms in the literature on moral epistemology. It 
would benefit our understanding to be able to classify their effects in epistemological terms, and 
not only the usual psychological ones. In this connection, it is worth noting that analysis of 
Roberts & Wood’s (2007) excellent and extensive discussion of intellectual vices reveals myriad 
references to psychic defence, sometimes explicit but more often implicit. I present three 
examples here.5 
 
The first comes in their discussion of Plantinga’s (1993: 12) discussion of an example from 
Locke, providing a nice historical precedent for the case made here. Locke (1690: IV.XX.11) 
imagines a professor’s reaction to a bright student who makes an objection that undermines his 
life’s work. Understandably, the professor immediately assumes the student is wrong. This 
unwarranted belief is the product of a defence against the shame of an academic life in error, and 
prevents the professor from thinking clearly about the objection (Roberts & Wood 2007: 96). 
This may be a momentary lapse in response to sudden change (which defence mechanisms can 
enable us to cope with), and as such, the professor may in time be able to see it for what it is. 
But if the defence against shame remains in place, operating unconsciously, his conviction that 
the student is wrong will feel epistemically justified, and the possible consequences for his self-
esteem, if he is aware of them at all, dismissed as irrelevant to his rejection of the objection. 
 
Under ‘failures of concern to know’, a vice relative to the virtue of the love of knowledge, 
Roberts & Wood note that people may decline opportunities to test their cherished beliefs or 
offer arguments they somehow know to be inadequate (2007: 170). A negative corollary here is 
an ‘unvirtuous concern not to know’ the truth. Bernard Williams (2002: 134) points out that 
because it is difficult to know whether one has invested enough effort in finding out the truth 
about some matter, ‘it is easy to convince oneself that one has taken enough pains’ when one has 
some internal obstacle to taking more, such as ‘at the most obvious level, laziness, but, more 
interestingly, the desires and wishes that are prone to subvert the acquisition of true belief’. 
Where such desires and wishes or their effects on one’s epistemic states are unrecognised, the 
lack of concern to reach the truth, or active concern to avoid it, is either the product of defence 
or motivates it. The defences protect one against the anxiety that would result from facing 
something unwished for or a threat to one’s sense of self or self-esteem.  
 
Third, Roberts & Wood note ‘the ubiquity of fear and the incidence of cowardice’ in relation to 
self-knowledge (2007: 222), but also point out that people fear knowledge of other kinds – 
criticisms of pet views, of their work, of facts that are painful to them, of others disagreeing with 
them, and of looking bad in front of their colleagues (2007: 219). In all these cases, what Roberts 
& Wood don’t point out is that what people fear is tied up with issues of self-esteem, thus 
increasing the risk of activating defence mechanisms, which may blind them to the truth about 
such criticisms, facts, and disagreements. 
 
7. These last remarks indicate that courage may decrease the use of defence mechanisms. But 
before developing that line of thought, it is worth rehearsing the importance of communal 
enquiry (§3). Some authors conceive this as a process of mutual correction; Williams casts his net 
more broadly to talk of ‘sustaining each other’s sense of reality’ (2002: 198), which may be done 
by other means than correction. It is not only that if people are not defensive at same time, or 
over the same issues, then they may see each other’s defences for what they are. As we will see, it 
is also that close relationship and dialogue with others is a means to the deconstruction of defences 
and the development of the virtues that enable this.  
 
This is important, since it is not merely identifying errors, but (where relevant) understanding their 
basis in defence that is needed; and it is not merely identifying, but deconstructing, defence 
mechanisms that is the aim here, for their continued activation will continue to the 
misapprehensions of the past. Given that the passions are an important source of judgments 
about reasons to feel, desire, and act in certain ways, deconstructing defence mechanisms will 
contribute to moral enquiry. 
 
We noted above that defence mechanisms lead to both a lack of transparency and error, not only 
with regard to one’s reasons, but also in self-understanding. The deconstruction of defence 
mechanisms is therefore, at the same time, a gain in self-understanding. 
 
8. Baehr (2011: 177) defines intellectual courage as ‘a disposition to persist in or with a state or 
course of action aimed at an epistemically good end despite the fact that doing so involves an 
apparent threat to one’s own well-being’. This is needed to face and experience the painful 
mental states against which defences protect. We often associate courage closely with strength of 
will and self-control, with being ‘tough’ and ‘impervious’ (Baehr 2011: 178), but in this context, 
that association can be misleading. For what is required is a kind of ‘letting go’. In contrast to 
directed introspection or reflection, this involves an openness to one’s passions, allowing them 
to ‘surface’. The aim of control is – at least temporarily – relinquished in favour of an approach 
of understanding and engagement with whatever it is felt, however painful, inappropriate or 
irrational it seems. The challenge is compounded by the knowledge that one’s emotional life is 
not under one’s control, even if it can, over time, be transformed. 
 
But the danger is that defence mechanisms kick in unless one actively seeks to tolerate and admit 
into conscious thought whatever it is one feels. Thus, the courageous exercise of will lies in 
making and sustaining a commitment to this openness despite the pain it brings. To put it into 
Baehr’s terms, opening oneself to feelings that are painful, and thus pose an apparent threat to 
one’s well-being, forms part of the deconstruction of one’s defences, which is a course of action 
aimed at the epistemically good end of moral knowledge. Intellectual courage enables the pursuit 
of the project of moral enquiry in the face of the pain it brings. 
 
9. We have seen several times that defences are connected especially to self-esteem. As often as 
not, mental states defended against are not intrinsically painful, but become so because the agent 
evaluates them negatively. They are inappropriate, unacceptable, shameful, fearful, and so on. In 
the final analysis, they are deemed to diminish one’s value; or in more concrete psychological 
terms, to make one less lovable or perhaps unlovable; or yet more specifically, unlovable by 
particular people. Discovering the existence of such states for a moment – which may soon be 
succeeded by re-establishing the defence against them – is far easier than integrating them into 
one’s sense of self (Freud 1926: 224). The deconstruction of a defence requires a reconstruction 
of the self. Where parts of the self are defended against because they are inappropriate etc., what 
is needed is acceptance. 
 
This idea needs careful understanding. Acceptance does not mean moral approval. Someone who 
only accepts in herself what she can approve of falsely conflates her real psychological self with 
her ideal self. Defences are often responses to, and supported by, a false and idealized sense of 
oneself. Again, it can be the inconsistency with one’s self-image that makes the unacknowledged 
mental state painful (Lear 2003: 117-9). But understanding both the passion and the ideal must 
precede the judgment that it is the ideal that should stand firm, and the passion should give way. 
It can’t be assumed, at the outset, that the ideals are supported by the balance of reasons if one’s 
grasp of those reasons is only secure once self-understanding is achieved. Ideals can themselves 
be defences against passions (witness the cases of false altruism and abortion). Both passion and 
ideal need to be understood and allowed – for now – to stand as genuine expressions of the self. 
The tension between them may diminish as self-transformation follows upon the deconstruction 
of defences. 
 
It is, in any case, a mistake to attempt to change one’s passion before one has understood what 
there is of oneself in it; self-improvement should follow on from, not substitute for, self-
understanding (Wollheim 2003: 35). Moran (2001) is right that, on many occasions of reflection, 
the question ‘what do I feel?’ may be answered by considering reasons to feel this way or that, i.e. 
‘what should I feel?’. But on many others, what is felt or desired is given to one, and awareness of 
the passion is arrived at quite independently of considering reasons for feeling or wanting. Of 
course, this way of feeling may be inappropriate, and the agent may judge it so. Moran (2001: 59-
60) proposes that if such a passion is not corrected by reflection on what to feel, it is ‘alien’ to 
the agent. This is epistemologically and psychologically unsatisfactory (Wollheim 2003: 32f.). The 
theory of defence explains why rational reflection fails, for it cannot uncover nor undo what is 
sustaining the passion. But the passion is not to be disposed of by the thought that it is 
unworthy and therefore ‘alien’ to what one takes to be one’s ‘true’ self, but is in fact one’s 
‘idealised’ self. 
 
We may understand acceptance as involving the work of a range of intellectual virtues. First, 
there is the resistance to the influence of ideals (and desires to be ideal) on beliefs about the self, 
deriving from a ‘virtuous concern to know’. Second, the truth is accorded its appropriate 
importance, as facts about, and experiences of, the self are neither dismissed or ignored. In this, 
of course, courage will play its role. A third virtue is more usually associated with character than 
the intellect – a form of love we may call compassion or loving kindness. 
 
10. The passions against which people defend can only secure a place in their conception of their 
(imperfect) selves as they come to reject the sense that such passions make them unlovable. Love, 
therefore, plays a necessary role. If one’s passions do not make one unlovable, they do not need 
to be hidden; honesty, at least with oneself, becomes possible.6 This is one role that relationships 
with others can provide. A model of how such relationships work may be gleaned from 
psychoanalysis. Contemporary psychoanalysts emphasise the nature of the therapeutic 
relationship as much as ‘insight’ in the account of how defences are deconstructed (see Lacewing 
forthcoming for detailed discussion and empirical defence of the following sketch). The therapist 
retains their interest, curiosity, and care, and remains non-moralising and non-retaliatory in the 
face of the patient’s revelations and passions. This repeated disconfirmation of the patient’s 
expectations challenges their sense of self and relationship, and enables their defences to be 
withdrawn.  
 
This process is, at the same time, supportive of the development of self-understanding. One key 
expression of this supportive form of relationship is precisely the open-minded, empathic, non-
defensive exploration of the patient’s mind. This truthfulness is itself part of the caring 
relationship that corrects the patient’s defensive expectations. Over time, the patient internalises 
both the truthfulness and the care shown by the therapist, and thus the development of self-
understanding can lie in relationship with another (Eagle 2011: 285). Compassion for oneself – 
for one’s pain and vulnerability to it, for the inevitable failure to be perfect – enables the pain 
against which defence mechanisms defend to be tolerated without denying reality. Compassion 
complements courage in its epistemic function: courage enables the pain of deconstructing 
defences to be endured, compassion diminishes or contains the pain as it preserves a sense of 
self-worth in the midst of emotions that challenge that sense. 
 
11. It can be that the search for self-understanding itself contributes to self-transformation. 
Developing Cramer’s example of projected anger from §5: having projected his anger onto 
Chrissy, Chris respond by withdrawing affection, citing ‘her’ anger as his reason. If he recognises 
that he is angry, but projected this onto Chrissy, he may understand his withdrawal as a form of 
punishment motivated by his anger. If he does not attempt to foreclose his self-recognition here, 
Chris may seek to understand his anger and why he projected it, being open to the anxiety his 
anger brings him (at least in relation to Chrissy) and whatever imaginings, memories, or other 
emotions may follow. Chris struggles here, so he asks someone with whom he can talk about 
such things, and remains open and alert to what arises in him in response. A vague sense of 
discomfort at being angry clarifies into a richer, more content-laden fear. As a result, Chris 
comes to understand the situation in which he considered withdrawing affection quite 
differently, e.g. as one in which he feared his need for love would not be met. In defence, he had 
imagined the need for love was Chrissy’s, and punished her for the neediness by being angry 
with her. But this was all still too anxiety-ridden, so he projected the anger onto her, which 
‘justified’ his withdrawal of affection – neatly turning his need for love into a fantastical act of 
self-sufficiency.  
 
This kind of recognition can contribute to preventing the same defence from occurring in the 
future; while it is not the whole story, self-understanding can contribute to the deconstruction of 
defence. 
 
12. The deconstruction of defence mechanisms is transformative. It is transformative of one’s 
passions, for they no longer threaten one’s sense of self-worth; of one’s self, as the range of 
emotional experience in which one can be oneself, is expanded; and of self-understanding, as the 
passions’ lack of transparency, at least as it derives from defence, yields to a sense of their 
meaning and significance as they come to be understood in consciousness. With this, the 
passions themselves may simply die away, diminish in force, take new and more acceptable 
forms, or become amenable to rational reflection; and the same is true of our ideals and 
judgments of appropriateness. But should both the passions and the judgments of their 
inappropriateness remain unchanged, as frequently happens, then having granted them a place in 
one’s conscious psychology, one may at least become aware of such influence as they may have 
on one’s sense of oneself and the situations one faces, and correct for it as best one can.  
 
In either case, this transformation of the structure of the passions impacts directly upon moral 
enquiry. With defensive distortions diminished, we may re-evaluate what we have reason to do 
with greater perspicuity. And from the position of greater self-understanding, we shall better 
contribute to and learn from communal enquiry. 
 
13. We began from the assumption that the passions are an important source of intuitions about 
reasons to act, feel, and desire in certain ways. They are active not only in responses to situations, 
but also in processes of reflection and deliberation. But they can be misleading, and in ways that 
operate outside unawareness; they are lack transparency. One cause of this is the occurrence of 
defence mechanisms creating unconscious distortions in the agent’s understanding of what he 
feels and why. Such distortions in turn result in distortions in his understanding of the situations 
to which he respond and the reasons which they furnish, as demonstrated in the examples of 
abortion, false altruism, and lying, and the discussion of three intellectual vices from Roberts & 
Wood. Thus, moral enquiry may be aided by the deconstruction of defence mechanisms. We 
identified the importance of close relationship and dialogue with others, together with specific 
forms of courage, self-acceptance, and finally compassion, as productive in this regard. 
 
The deconstruction of defence mechanisms and the greater self-understanding that results is, of 
course, not sufficient for moral knowledge. But in its absence, I have argued, we may fail to 
understand the passions on which our moral judgments rest. The refinement of our moral 
sensibilities involves the deconstruction of our defences, as a step towards gaining both a finer, 
more nuanced and realistic grasp of the situations with which we are confronted, and refined and 
more appropriate responses to them, no longer distorted in ways we fail to recognise by the 
influence of passions that we cannot tolerate in ourselves. 
 
References 
Baehr, J. (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Chaiken, S. & Trope, Y. (1999). Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology.  New York: Guilford 
Press.  
Cottingham, J. (1998). Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and 
Psychoanalytic Ethics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Cramer, P. (2006). Protecting the self: Defense mechanisms in action.  New York: Guilford Press.  
Dijksterhuis, A. (2010). Automaticity and the unconscious. In S. Fiske, D. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey 
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 228-67). New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Doris, J. M. & the Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.) (2010). The Moral Psychology 
Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eagle, M. N. (2011). From Classical to Contemporary Psychoanalysis: A Critique and Integration.  New 
York: Taylor & Francis.  
Freud, A. (1936). The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence.  London: The Hogarth Press.  
Freud, S. (1926). Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud XX(pp. 75-176). London: Hogarth Press.  
Goldie, P. (2008). Misleading emotions. In G. Brun, U. Doguoglu, & D. Kuenzle (Eds.), 
Epistemology and emotions. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.  
Haidt, J. (2001). The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814-34.  
Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316(5827), 998-1002.  
Hursthouse, R. (1991). Virtue Theory and Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20(3), 223-246.  
Kennett, J. & Fine, C. (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?. Ethical theory and 
moral practice, 12(1), 77-96.  
Lacewing, M. (2005). Emotional Self-Awareness and Ethical Deliberation. Ratio, 18(1), 65-81.  
Lacewing, M. (forthcoming). Long-Term Psychodynamic Psychotherapy, Insight and 
Therapeutic Action. 
Lear, J. (2003). Therapeutic Action: An Earnest Plea for Irony.  London: Karnac.  
Lemma, A. (2005). The many faces of lying. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 86, 737-753.  
Lenman, J. (2008). Expressivism and Epistemology: What is Moral Inquiry?. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 81, 63-81.  
Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  London.  
McDowell, J. (1985). Values and Secondary Qualities. In T. Honderich (Ed.) Morality and 
Objectivity (pp. 110-29). London: Routledge. 
Moran, R. (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Nietzsche, F. W. (1998 [1886]). Beyond Good and Evil.  Trans. and ed. by Marion Faber. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The Current Debate.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Roberts, R. C. & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology.  
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other.  Cambridge MA: Belknap Press.  
Snow, N. E. (2010). Virtue As Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory.  New York: Taylor 
& Francis.  
Tiberius, V. (2008). The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our Limits.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Vaillant, G. E. (1993). The Wisdom of the Ego.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Vaillant, G. E. (2000). Defense mechanisms. In A. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (vol. 2,  
pp. 454-457). Washington, DC: American Psychological Press, 2000. 
Wiggins, D. (1987). A Sensible Subjectivism. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of 
Value (pp. 185-214). Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Williams, B. (2002). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.  Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
Wollheim, R. (2003). On the Freudian Unconscious. Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, 77(2), 23-35. 
 
                                                 
1 The first sense is discussed (and rejected) by Cottingham 1998 and Goldie 2008; the second by 
Moran 2001. 
2 Much discussed at present are results from social psychology that support a ‘dual process’ 
model of psychology in general (Chaiken & Trope 1999; Wilson 2002; Dijksterhuis 2010), and of 
moral thinking in particular (Haidt 2001, 2007, Doris et al 2010). This is not my focus here. As 
Tiberius (2008, Ch. 5), Snow (2010), and Kennett & Fine (2009) make clear, drawing upon a 
wealth of empirical studies, while the challenge requires a significant re-evaluation of the nature 
and relation of introspection to self-knowledge, it has been somewhat overstated. There are 
possibilities for correcting misleading passions that arise from the kinds of non-conscious, 
automatic processes discussed in this literature, at least over time, if not always in the moment. 
3 Experimental evidence for the idea of defence mechanisms and the psychological models it 
deploys is neatly marshalled and discussed in Cramer 2006. 
4 Vaillant (1993: 132, Table 4) provides evidence that of those in the top 20% on a scale of 
psychosocial adjustment at 65 years old, 50% still use less than mature defences, and the 
percentage for those lower on the scale is considerably higher. Cramer (2006: 204) notes that 
neurotic defences are likely to survive into adulthood, and remarks on the widespread 
distribution in ‘normal’ samples of characteristics defining psychological disorders, e.g. 
depressive tendencies, phobias, pathological aggression, antisocial traits, etc. that are associated 
with the use of defence (224, 235). 
5 Similar connections to those drawn below can be made for dogmatism (195), stolid 
perserverance (200), comprehensional rigidity (205), scrupulosity (231), vanity (237), arrogance 
(243-5), vices related to aspects of intellectual autonomy regarding one’s relations to others (265-
6, 268), and a lack of intellectual generosity (287). 
6 As defences have a developmental history, and were often initiated for good reason, a person’s  
sense that some passion makes them unlovable may be realistic in the context of a specific 
relationship. For example, she may defend against her anger, which is repressed or transformed 
into depression, as previous love objects, e.g. parents, did indeed withdraw their love whenever 
she expressed it. But, assuming she is now grown up, what she fears and expects is not just that 
getting angry will disrupt her current relationship with my parents, but that anger is 
unacceptable. But the childhood situation does not generalise, and others will not all act the 
same way; but neither is it right to say, simply, that the fault lies in my anger per se. A process of 
further self-development will involve discovering the reasonable place of anger in loving 
relationships. 
